Forgetting, Knowledge, and Action: Gertrude Stein’s Modernist Terms
In 1910 Gertrude Stein wrote the lines, “She is forgetting anything. This is not a disturbing thing, this is not a distressing thing, this is not an important thing. She is forgetting anything and she is remembering that thing, she is remembering that she is forgetting anything.” The piece was “Many Many Women” (1933), a genre-bending work featuring a series of paragraphs all describing unidentified women referred to by the pronoun “she.” Hallmarking Stein’s trademark development of abstraction and repetition in her “continuous present,” the idiosyncratic sentences invite the reader to search both anaphorically and cataphorically for the proper referents to the author’s slippery pronouns, as if to produce the feeling of forgetting itself. In choosing the present progressive over the simple present tense, Stein rejects a grammatical model that assumes a state of before/after change, induces telic events that follow one another, or gives the reader temporal perspective within the timeline that language creates. Rather, she stalls the forward movement of narrative time and action. The progressive refuses the finality of thought and generates an ongoing process of mental and physical activities that are overlapping and atelic. Forgetting, in this grammatical form, is shown to be suspenseful and dramatic. Repetition is less of a reenactment of the past than what Stein calls an “insistence” of what is happening. When the remembered thing turns out to be forgetting itself—“she is remembering that she is forgetting anything”—forgetting assumes the status of a positive word that resists the conquest of memory (“Many Many Women,” 119). It refuses us its referent (Stein never retrieves the object of the forgotten “anything”) and remains a limit case for referential language, which at once becomes free-floating and excessive. The possibility of forgetting anything opens up the possibility of forgetting everything, a leap permitted by the indefinite nature of oblivion’s grammatical forms. Such play on forgetting is only one of many instances exemplifying Stein’s life-long interest in a radical project of forgetfulness. Traditionally, the word “forget,” defined by the OED as “to lose remembrance of,” has connoted privation, defined by its opposition to or negation of other terms. Remembrance is the most obvious of these terms, but the opposition between forgetting and remembering has also served as a proxy for more subtle antagonisms: forgetting and justice, forgetting and truth, and even life and death. At the turn of the twentieth century, however, the concept began to acquire new conceptual capital for artists and philosophers. Following Friedrich Nietzsche, figures such as Sigmund Freud, Henri Bergson, Ezra Pound, and Filippo Tommaso Marinetti began to view forgetting as something active rather than lethargic, potentially willful rather than involuntary, positive rather than privative. On the one hand, forgetting’s antagonistic power became more relevant than ever to the revolutionary spirit of paradigmatic shifts in art and science. “A science that hesitates to forget its founders is lost,” Alfred North Whitehead said. On the other hand, its changing status allowed it to acquire new meanings, shifting, for instance, the problem of memory from one of conservation to selection or suggesting that the things one can’t recall are in fact significant enough to be forgotten or repressed. The very existence of the word “forget” even begs the question of whether “to forget” is always synonymous with “not to remember.” Grammatically and logically speaking, “not to remember” is a negation of “to remember,” but forgetting—while it may sometimes have the same meaning as “not to remember”—is itself a third term. The very fact that we have it in our language suggests that “forgetting” has some kind of independence. The word significantly reminds us that forgetting is an actual process, not necessarily just the absence of another one.